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THE PROBLEM OF COMPETITION AMONG
DOMESTIC TRUNK AIRLINES-Part 11*
By DAVID W. BLUESTONE
Director, Air Transport Division, Defense Air Transport Admin-
istration, Department of Commerce. Formerly economi8t with the
Civil Aeronautics Board. B.S. in M.E. (aero.), 1933; M.A., 1943;
Ph.D., 1953.
WHAT Is AIRLINE COMPETITION?
What Are the Advantages and Disadvantages of Competition
In Free Enterprise?
IT HIS part briefly outlines some of the pros and cons of competition
and monopoly in the free enterprise system. It is not meant to be
a full catalog of arguments either in economic theory or in business
fact; such weighty projects have been done at great length in many
other places.
The arguments for competition are that it produces maximum
quality of service, does it at minimum cost, keeps profits low but ade-
quate to continue business, eliminates the weakest producers and raises
the efficiency of the industry by leaving only the strong firms in exist-
ence, distributes capital and labor into the most desirable channels,
and balances supply and demand in the entire economy at the point
of lowest price and highest production.
The really basic argument for competition, from which all benefits
come, is that it provides strong and continuous incentive to progress.
Initiative is stimulated by rivalry continually to make improvements,
to adopt new inventions and to devise new business methods rapidly,
to eliminate wastes, to go after new markets, to lower profit margins.
All of this cuts the costs of production and the selling prices, which
then broadens the market to more consumers, which in turn allows
still more economies of large-scale production, and so on in a con-
tinuing beneficial chain of progress.
By contrast, monopoly has the reverse effect. It aims at maximum
profit, just as does all business. But, being a monopoly, it accomplishes
this identical objective by opposite means. The keystone of monopoly
is control of the market. It then stabilizes prices to produce the highest
gross dollar profit, which is usually at a higher unit price, with output
restricted to what it can sell at its own fixed price. Similarly, it tries
to hold its investment as low as it can, and with minimum risk; it
therefore continues using old equipment and old business practices
after a competitive industry would have been forced to discard them
*This paper is an abridgement of the author's Ph.D. dissertation. The views
expressed are entirely his own, and not those of the government agencies of his
present or past employment.
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under threat of bankruptcy. Although it may reduce costs, it does not
have the spur of competition to force improvements. Its whole tend-
ency is toward higher prices and a smaller market, restricting benefits
to fewer consumers.
Practically no one is for unregulated monopoly. But many people
realize that the benefits of competition are not produced without con-
siderable additional costs. There are higher operating costs, higher
capital costs, a higher rate of loss on obsolescence and unsuccessful
experimentation.
In operating costs, competition has the wastes of multiple manage-
ments performing duplicate jobs with multiple operating organizations,
purchasing, legal, research, and accounting departments. There are
wastes of lower utilization, with each competitor geared up to handle
his individual peak. There are the wastes of competitive advertising
and sales efforts. There is the waste of secrecy in hiding better methods
from competitors.
In capital costs, competition has the wastes of excess capacity. It
needs enough to match the peaks of competitors. It requires more
reserve capacity, since several small operations take a higher percentage
of spare capacity than does one large operation. And the financing
expenses of several smaller companies are higher.
The function of management is largely to adapt an industry to
change. This is often difficult, especially during times of rapid changes
in technology, government policies, and international alarms. But even
this is easier for an entire industry than for an individual company
with many competitors; not only is there the estimating of industry
trends, but the added complexity of estimating the individual firm's
share of this estimated trend.
The added burden on competitive managements makes planning
errors more likely, and of greater magnitude. It is particularly critical
in cyclical business swings. On the upswing each competitor adds
capacity, either overlooking the fact that the other competitors are
doing the same, or forced into dubious expansion to retain his share
of the market; there is then overexpansion in the aggregate. On the
downswing, each keeps his production too high, afraid to cut down
while a competitor maintains output and increases his share of the
falling market. In an industry like air transportation, where several
years elapse between the orders for new capacity and the delivery of
the aircraft to produce it, errors of planning magnify the usual swings
of business cycles.
The conclusion reached in this paper is that in the air transporta-
tion industry, the advantages of competition are outweighed by its
costs, and competition should therefore be drastically reduced. This
should not be misconstrued as an attack upon the advantages of com-
petition in the economy as a whole, or as an advocacy of reducing or
eliminating competition in the American free enterprise system. The
conclusion is reached solely for the subject of this study - the air trans-
port industry which differs in many major respects from the rest of
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the economy; the effect of competition in this industry is far different
from what is would be in the bulk of other industries.
For the American economy generally, competition has a tremendous
value apart from its advantages or disadvantages in any particular
industry. It acts as an automatic regulator for most of the economic
effort of the country. By its intricate mechanisms of price, profit, loss,
supply, and demand, it allocates the nation's resources. It allocates
capital, labor, and raw materials into fields which in the long run are
believed to produce the greatest profits. These are generally guided
by what consumers are most willing to purchase, and are therefore
closely responsive to the nation's effective economic demand.
In thus allocating resources to satisfy the effective market, competi-
tion does so with a maximum of individual initiative and managerial
freedom. If any attempt were made to do so by centralized direction
and control, it would require a tremendous bureaucracy with powers
to plan effectively and, whether actually employed or not, power to
dictate and regiment the economic life of the nation.
These are great advantages for society as a whole, and are not to
be lightly dismissed. They are basic to the free enterprise system and
are ingrained in the national tradition. Of course, like any human
endeavor, they are far from perfect. When any economic machinery
is moving, there is always some clanking and gear-clashing. Competi-
tion is not perfect as a regulator, and its workings are not perfect. Its
operations incur major costs to pay for its advantages. But for the
American economy, the overwhelming consensus of opinion is that the
competitive system works to a better overall advantage than would a
system of centrally directed monopolies.
This applies to the average industry. But certain industries differ
greatly from the nationwide average. Some segments of the economy
are not allowed to operate freely under the usual economic laws, and
this restriction is imposed by law and with the consent and even at the
insistence of the people. Air transportation is such a segment, and
competitive considerations for the economy as a whole do not apply
to this industry, regardless of how advantageous they are for most indus-
tries.
What Is Unregulated Competition?
Among sellers, competition is rivalry for the buyers' income. In
its usual sense, competition is thought of as rivalry among the pro-
ducers of the same commodity or of the same service, or of a group of
close substitutes.
Defining close substitutes becomes very difficult in specific cases.
An airplane trip for pleasure competes closely with a train or auto
trip, with a new television set, and with the dozens of daily expenses
that eat up a family's income. Here is a basic trouble in defining com-
petition: all consumers' goods compete to some extent with all others.
The perfect competition described in the economic textbooks has at
least four major prerequisites.
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First, no single producer can appreciably affect the market price.
His output is small in relation to the total industry. He therefore
assumes that the selling price is beyond his control, plans only as much
production as he believes he can sell at that price, and then sells all
his production at whatever price the market will bring. There are no
large producers who influence prices.
Second, his product is perfectly standardized. A potential customer
can't tell one producer's output from another's. There is no brand-
name preference and there is little reason for the multi-billion-dollar
advertising business.
Third, entry into the market is perfectly free, and of course exit
from it is just as free. If any new producer, foreign or domestic, can
meet the market price, he is in business. There is no hazard in trying
to break into an established industry, as long as the market price can
be equalled.
Fourth, the industry is free from government interference, and
from non-commercial incentives. There are no import or export tar-
iffs, no production quotas, no price controls, no direct or indirect
subsidies, no certificates of public convenience and necessity.
Obviously, this is not the competition of the real world. Few busi-
nessmen would recognize it. Economists generally admit that this is
just an ideal standard, 64 a thing of intellectual imagination, 5 some-
thing which probably does not exist, never did exist, and never can
exist.66 It is therefore obvious that any assumed characteristics of
competition can be no more realistic than the unrealistic assumptions
of their underlying theories.
In practice, of course, there is very imperfect competition. It is
generally what is known by the paradoxical name of "monopolistic
competition," where producers have so differentiated their products
in the minds of the consumers that there is sluggish reaction to price
changes. 67 There are various shades of gray, rather than the pure white
of competition and the pure black of monopoly, produced by histori-
cal development, custom and compromise, individual men's personali-
ties, and such common practices as trade association standardization,
price leadership, patent controls, market sharing, "fair trade" prac-
tices, and so on.
It is usually impossible to define the extent and type of compe-
tition existing in any specific industry. A major investigation of the
concentration of economic power6" defined effective competition as
existing where (1) producers are numerous, (2) the degree of con-
64 J. M. Clark, "Toward a Concept of Workable Competition," Readings in the
Social Control of Industry (American Economic Association; Philadelphia: The
Blakiston Company, 1942), p. 453.
65 Walton H. Hamilton, The Pattern of Competition (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1940), p. 5.66 Clair Wilcox, Competition and Monopoly in American Industry (U. S.
Temporary National Economic Committee,, Monograph No. 21. Washington:
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1940), p. 3.
67 Ibid., p. 4.
18 Ibid., p. 20.
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centration is low, (3) business mortality is high, (4) capacity is largely
used throughout business cycles, (5) different firms' prices are not
identical, (6) production stays up when a depression strikes, (7) profits
are moderate, and (8) prices are not rigid for long time periods. On
this basis, the domestic trunk airlines achieve effective competition only
on the last two of the eight items.
What Is Unregulated Monopoly?
A theoretically perfect monopoly can exist only when three condi-
tions are met. First, a monopolist must be the only producer. There
must be no other seller in the market, and no potential competitor.
Second, there can be no substitutes for the product or service. There
must be so little substitutability that the monopolist can take advan-
tage of his privileged position to set his selling price with the certainty
that the consumers can turn to no alternative source. Of course, poten-
tial consumers may choose to do without the product, and as the
monopolist raises the price his number of sales normally goes down.
He therefore theoretically adjusts his price so that the decreased num-
ber of sales multiplied by the increased unit price produces a maximum
gross dollar profit.
Third, there must be no possibility of government interference.
Obviously, a monopolist's policy will be affected when he knows that
even in the absence of potential competitors there is a threat of govern-
mental action.
Monopoly is usually associated in people's minds with the idea of a
single producer in the field. It is true, of course, that a single pro-
ducer has maximum freedom to control his prices and therefore maxi-
mum monopoly power. However, a true monopoly must satisfy the
conditions, not only of a singleness of producer, but also of no sub-
stitutability of product and no government interference.
When there are two producers - duopoly - each of the two is likely
to set his pricing policy with an eye on the probable reaction of the
other. He knows that his own price cut will usually be matched by
his rival, with a lowering of price but no increase in his share of the
market. The net effect of duopoly is therefore generally the same as
of monopoly, with prices deliberately adjusted to produce the highest
estimated gross profit.
When there are a very few producers - oliogoply - there is usually
the price stability of a monopoly. As in the case of duopoly, each pro-
ducer knows that his price cut will be met by the others6 9 There is,
of course, somewhat less predictability, since with an increase in the
,9 ". .. when there are only two or a few sellers . . . the result of a cut by
any one is inevitably to decrease his own profits, no one will cut, and, although
the sellers are entirely independent, the equilibrium result is the same as though
there were a monopolistic agreement between them." Edward Hastings Cham-
berlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition (fifth edition; Cambridge: Har-
vard University Press, 1946), p. 48.
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number of managements there is an increase in possible differences of
managerial opinion.
The keystone in the structure of monopoly power is control over
price. All economic theory of monopoly is based on this fact. All fear
of monopoly in the real world of business and politics is based on this
fundamental power. The greater the control over price, the tighter the
monopoly.
The government has increasingly taken over this control from
private managements. It has done so in the economy as a whole through
deficit financing, labor legislation, and taxes. It has done so in dozens
of specific industries through detailed price controls, direct and indirect
subsidies, minimum price supports, tariffs and import quotas, produc-
tion limitations, and huge volumes of government contracts. And of
course, it has done so to the maximum whenever it sets up direct regu-
lation of an industry. When any industry has its prices subject to
detailed approval by a government agency, it has lost the indispensable
element of monopoly power - control of price.
What Are the Advantages and Disadvantages of Competition
in Regulated Public Utilities?
Major segments of the economy have been removed from the work-
ings of the free enterprise system and placed under public regulation.
They include the local public utilities - electricity, gas, and water;
communications - telephone, telegraph, radio, and television; and
transportation - by seaway, inland waterway, railway, highway, and
airway.
Most of these industries were once an integral part of the free
enterprise system. Competition once was open for these industries,
and competition was found wanting. In the words of the Supreme
Court, "The introduction in the United States of the certificate of
public convenience and necessity marked the growing conviction that
under certain circumstances free competition might be harmful to the
community .... ,70
In these industries, competition frequently led to industrial war-
fare with unstable prices and undependable services. The destruction
of utilities came about through cut-throat competition. Under such
conditions, each carrier competitively reduces his prices until they
cover only variable costs and fail to meet the fixed costs. The reason
for this is that if no traffic at all is carried, not only does the carrier fail
to meet its fixed costs, but also fails to meet much of what is usually
classed as variable costs; it is better to carry traffic and lose some money
than not to carry traffic and lose more." Investment per unit of output
70 285 U. S. 262 (1931), New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, p. 282.
71 D. Philip Locklin, Economics of Transportation (revised edition; Chicago:
Business Publications, Inc., 1938), p. 149.
Truman C. Bigham, Transportation: Principles and Problems (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1946), p. 113.
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was often too high, and the wastes of duplicate facilities were particu-
larly heavy. When the utilities went bankrupt, the dependent com-
munities were left without service. In addition, the struggle often led
to monopolistic combinations and agreements to eliminate competi-
tion, without the safeguard of public regulation. As the Supreme
Court said about such costs, "... . when a railroad inflicts injury upon
its rival, it may be the public which ultimately bears the loss." 72
The process of carving individual industries out of the free enter-
prise system was not done on the basis of some cohesive economic
theory. It was done by diverse legislative bodies, responsive to many
specific pressures that mixed economics, politics, social movements,
and the strength of particular personalities. It was upheld by the de-
cisions of a long line of judicial bodies on a case-by-case basis.
What is the definition of a public utility, other than a mere listing
of industries in which regulation has been upheld by the courts?
Many attempts have been made at analytical definition. The most
common characteristics appearing in these definitions are "natural"
monopoly, indispensability of product, the sale of service rather than
commodity, nonstorability of the service, relatively great capital invest-
ment required, large scale of operations needed for efficient operation,
etc. More characteristics can be added as more authorities are con-
sulted.
One unfortunate defect in these attempted definitions is that they
do not all apply to all public utilities. Tremendous differences exist
in almost all these characteristics. Within transportation alone, for
example, consider the contrasts between a huge railroad network with
its own rights-of-way and a one-man trucking outfit using public high-
ways, or between a scheduled intercontinental airline with its fleet of
costly planes and a nonscheduled air carrier operating one or two
leased aircraft.
The other unfortunate defect in these attempted definitions is that
many of the characteristics also apply to unregulated industries. Con-
sider, for example, the "natural" monopoly of aluminum ore sources,
the indispensability of food, the rise of entire industries producing
only services, the nonstorability of newspapers' news, and the huge
capital investments of steel mills.
In short, most definitions omit much of what they purport to
include, and include much of what they are supposed to omit. In
general, "the significant factor surrounding public utilities has been
the imperfect operation of economic forces, thereby giving the utilities
an excessive amount of economic power over those obliged to bargain
with them." 73 Their designation is only partial, and is historical and
legal rather than a matter of economic theory.
Public utilities live in a predominantly free-enterprise competitive
72 270 U. S. 266 (1925), Texas & Pacific Railway v. Gulf, Colorado and Santa
Fe Railway Co.
73 C. Woody Thompson and Wendell R. Smith, Public Utility Economics
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1941), p. 56.
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system. The criterion of normalcy taken for them by the regulatory
agencies is therefore an estimate of how the industry would behave if
it were still responsive to the competitive system. This is obviously
an impossible task; if they responded normally to the competitive
system they would not have been designated as public utilities. In
addition, the concept of regulation has gradually shifted from control
of utility abuses to public managerial supervision for improving serv-
ice and reducing cost.
But regulation, like free competition before it, has also been found
wanting. It is the view of many critics of public regulation that it can-
not take the place of competition as an incentive to progress. Regula-
tion still predominantly stresses the negative aspect of prohibiting
abuses, rather than the positive drive for new achievements. It also
loses initiative by splitting control between itself and private manage-
ments. Its usual policy of fair return on fair investment is a drag on
initiative, since gains in efficiency and reductions in cost frequently
produce price cuts ordered by the regulatory agency, and the utility
ends up with no greater profits than before. The utility's legally pro-
tected position also relieves it of the stimulus of freely competitive
threats.
There is a widespread belief that regulated businesses are slower
to introduce technological advances. This is difficult to prove or dis-
prove. For one thing, the investment situations are far different. Public
utilities typically have an investment per dollar of annual gross rev-
enue of five-to-one or six-to-one, compared to a ratio of one-to-one for
manufacturing firms, and of one-to-four or one-to-five for trading cor-
porations.1 4 Obviously, industries with such high relative investments
will be very cautious in making obsolete their huge investments, re-
gardless of regulation. And they have many advances to their credit -
completely automatic telephone systems; extremely efficient generation
and distribution of electricity; even in railroads, frequently thought of
as backward, a one-third increase of traffic per labor man-hour occurred
in the single decade 1929-1939 while volume fell one-fourth. 75
But whether or not it is true, it is generally believed that regulated
industries show slower technical advances. And, after balancing the
unsatisfactory results of competition against the unsatisfactory results
of regulation, many people have decided on the compromise of using
both in combination. This seems to be at the heart of the problem of
regulating a number of public utilities.
This is a real dilemma. On the one hand, there is the argument
that if there are two imperfect methods, the proper solution is, to
74 Irston R. Barnes, The Economics of Public Utility Regulation (New York:
F. S. Crofts and Co., 1942), p. 63.
It should be noted that airlines differ markedly from other public utilities in
this respect; the ratio of investment to gross annual revenues for the domestic
trunk airlines was only 0.6 in 1952.
75 Arthur F. Burns, in his Introduction. Thor Hultgren, American Trans-
portation in Prosperity and Depression (New York: National Bureau of Economic
Research, Inc., 1948), p. viii.
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combine them and take advantage of the best of each: "Given two
instrumentalities each of which has limitations, it would seem the part
of wisdom to continue to rely on the eclectic principle that their com-
bination may be expected to give better results than either a "free
market" or governmental direction could produce separately."7 6 On
the other hand there is the argument that if there are two unsatisfactory
methods, the solution is to strengthen one or the other and use it ex-
clusively, not "to combine uneconomic competition with phlegmatic
regulation, on the hypothesis that two failures fused spell success." 77
How Does Regulation Affect Airlines?
It is frequently pointed out that airlines do not show many of the
characteristics usually associated with public utilities. For this reason
many believe that legal one-carrier monopolies are not desirable in
air transportation, but that a greater degree of competition can be
mixed with public regulation.
For one thing, the usual public utilities' high ratio of investment
to annual revenues is not applicable to air transportation. As was
pointed out previously, this ratio is five or six to one for utilities, but
only 0.6 to one for airlines; the heavy fixed capital charges which
pressed many unregulated utilities toward cut-throat competition are
minor here.
For another thing, it is claimed that air transportation does not
have the high fixed costs typical of most public utilities. This is literally
true, but it is also true that the charges which are normally considered
fixed in other industries are converted into variable costs for the air-
lines. Railroads and pipelines must pay for their right-of-way in capi-
tal costs. Motor transports, water transports, and air transports do not;
they use publicly maintained ground facilities. However, they pay
varying percentages of the estimated ground facility cost; the airlines
pay something for the use of airports and airways, and the problem is
currently being studied of having them pay to an increasing extent.
Another fixed cost is depreciation. In the case of airlines, this
approaches a variable cost, not because there is no depreciation, but
because the major capital asset - aircraft - has such a high rate of
obsolescence that they are written off the books in the very short time
of seven years. Numbers and types of new aircraft can be more rapidly
adjusted to traffic demands, and therefore do not provide excess capacity
hanging over the market for an extended time. And, though fixed
charges as such are not high, it should be remembered that indirect
costs are higher than direct operating expenses for this industry.78
71 Burton N. Behling, "The Nature and Control of the Transport Market,"
U. S. National Resources Planning Board, Transportation and National Policy
(House Document No. 883, 77th Congress, 2nd Session. Washington: U. S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, 1942), p. 242.
77 Burton N. Behling, Competition and Monopoly in Public Utility Industries
(Urbana, Ill.: The University of Illinois Press, 1938), p. 80.
78 U. S. Civil Aeronautics Board, Recurrent Report of Financial Data.
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It has also been objected that this industry is still in its infancy,
with rapid changes taking place technically in aircraft and navigation,
and financially in costs and types of services. However, it should be
remembered that airlines have been operated under private manage-
ments for over 25 years, a fairly respectable age for an "infant."
The fact that air transportation has been subjected to public
utility regulation reveals some of its original economic characteris-
tics. But more important is the fact that regulation is now their domi-
nant feature. Air transportation is probably the most highly regulated
of all public utilities. In addition to all the standard regulatory meas-
ures, it is also under the powerful economic control of government-
granted subsidies.
There is a long and important list of specific economic controls
imposed by the Civil Aeronautics Act which remove this industry from
comparability with the normal free enterprise system: entry into busi-
ness only upon receipt of a certificate or exemption by the CAB, trans-
fer or abandonment of a route only by permission of the CAB, control
of prices and joint fares, adequacy of service control, duty to carry all
mail offered, regulation of relations with anyone in any phase of aero-
nautics, keeping accounts in prescribed form, compliance with labor
provisions of the Railway Labor Act.
All these government chains on individual commercial liberty
would seem to be exquisitely designed to prevent any businessman from
even dreaming of entering the industry. Why, then, do dozens of
applicants continually attempt to squeeze themselves into such an
uncomfortable straitjacket?
The inducement is not the fact that, like other public utility indus-
tries, they are protected from competitors. The CAB often allows paral-
lel competition.
The real inducement is the mail pay provision of the Act. In fixing
the rate of compensation for carrying the mail, the CAB must take
into account the need of each carrier for enough revenue from all
sources to enable it to continue to develop air transportation.79
This does not mean the CAB guarantees a profit to each carrier
each year. But it does mean that in the long run each carrier holding
a certificate has the prospect of receiving enough revenue, between its
commercial business and the government's mail payments, to keep
going. Under reasonable management, it cannot go bankrupt. Unlike
most other private businesses, or most public utilities, it is not depend-
ent solely upon revenues from its commercial customers. The U. S.
Treasury is always its ultimate financial resource. Under the existing
Act, this guarantee goes on forever.
7s "In fixing and determininm fair and reasonable rates of compensation . . .
the [CAB] shall take into consideration . . . the need of each such air carrier
for compensation for the transportation of mail sufficient to insure the perform-
ance of such service, and, together with all other revenue of the air carrier, to
enable such air carrier under honest, economical and efficient management, to
maintain and continue the development of air transportation to the extent and
of the character and quality required for the commerce of the United States, the
Postal Service, and the national defense." (Sec. 406b).
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"Free enterprise" means freedom to compete, freedom to enter
into business, freedom to set prices, freedom to provide any quality of
service the businessman deems best, freedom from more government
regulation than other businesses, freedom to operate under normal
profit-and-loss economic motives without government guarantee. Each
of these freedoms has an immediate and direct bearing upon the com-
petitive behavior of the industry, and upon the benefits of competition
to the industry and to the public whose free economic actions support
the industry. Any attempt to apply the concepts of competition as
envisioned under free enterprise conditions, must be reexamined very
critically when trying to apply them to an industry lacking these free-
doms. Loss of a single one of these freedoms makes a great difference;
loss of all of them produces a set of considerations far outside the famil-
iar economic analysis in which competition is usually examined.
How Does Subsidy Affect Airlines?
A basic assumption in all thinking about economics is that the
dominant long-run business motive is to acquire monetary profits and
to avoid monetary losses. Fear of bankruptcy is the continual goad to
management, and bankruptcy is the ultimate test of business survival.
Obviously the subsidy provisions of the Civil Aeronautics Act have
exempted airline managements from this threat as long as they main-
tain honest, economical, and efficient management. It therefore per-
vades all managerial decisions and may reduce their incentive to greater
economy and efficiency. It may easily foster uneconomic competition,
for competition between companies each of whose competitive losses
may be charged to the federal Treasury is scarcely the same kind of
creature usually thought of when using the word "competition."
It is not intended here to argue the pros and cons of airline subsidy.
The word itself, in popular usage, has a most unpleasant connotation
as though the subsidized industry - if other than one's own - is en-
gaged in a legal but morally shabby raid on the taxpayers. In economic
theory, on the other hand, a subsidy is a payment made in order to
produce some estimated public benefits not measurable in dollars.
Balancing the benefits against payments is difficult: how many dollars
a year is it worth to this country to have the great speed and conven-
ience of air mail? How many dollars a year is it worth for business
and pleasure travel to save time by air transport? How many dollars a
year is it worth to have a reserve of planes and trained men ready for
immediate strategic support of possible war operations?
Air transportation receives different kinds of subsidies. One kind
is directed to the industry as a whole rather than to any specific bene-
ficiary; it is the uncharged-for portion of public financing of airports,
airways, weather services, basic aeronautical research, military under-
writing of the cost of new transport prototypes. Another kind is made
by some air transportation customers paying in part for the transporta-
tion of other customers, as when the profits made from the customers on
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high-density routes and large traffic centers offset the losses from the
customers at equal fares on the low-density routes and small traffic
points. Another kind of subsidy is the special privilege granted by a
public franchise, when a carrier may enjoy the monopoly or oligopoly
of a profitable route which might well be profitless if subjected to
unlimited competition. And the other kind-the only kind that is
usually thought of when using the word "subsidy" in connection with
airlines - is the direct mail payments made to individual carriers after
deducting the estimated "service" cost of carrying the mail. All of these
subsidies have varying degrees of influence upon each airline. It is of
particular importance to note that subsidy in the form of granting
favorable route franchises may eliminate all thought of "subsidy"
assistance from the public mind since it normally reduces the direct
mail payments usually associated in the public mind as the "subsidy"
to airlines.
The objectives of the Civil Aeronautics Act require the payment
of subsidies for an indeterminate period of time. The Act is to pro-
mote, as well as to regulate. It provides for the long-range future, as
well as for the immediate present. As such, it clearly calls for expan-
sion by artificial stimulation beyond the justification of current eco-
nomic conditions. This means that at any given time, the expenses
for promotion ploughed into the services will frequently be greater
than the revenue reaped from the promotional effort at the same time.
They are not necessarily greater than the revenues they produce at a
later time, although with continued promotion the expenses at that
later time will again be out of phase with the still later revenues which
should theoretically be balanced against them. A sound economic sys-
tem for air transportation, therefore, is not current economic self-
sufficiency, but the promise of self-sufficiency at a time of maturity at
some unstated period in the future. In the meanwhile, there is over-
expansion and excess capacity if judged by normal economic criteria.
The mail payment provisions of the Act do not guarantee regular
profits to the airlines. The industry is highly unstable in its financial
results, depending among other factors upon the overall economic
activity of the country, the relative changes in traffic and capacity and
the resulting load factors, the costs of a rapidly developing technology,
and the unit prices of what the airlines buy in the general economy.
This instability is shown by the wide range of results for the domestic
trunklines since the end of the war, from a net loss of some $22,400,000
(after mail pay of almost $21,380,000) for the year ended June 30,
1947, to a net operating profit before taxes of $106,300,000 (including
mail pay of $40,000,000) for the year ended September 30, 1951.0
The CAB mail payment procedure is based primarily on estimates
of future revenues and expenses. These estimates have hit wide of the
mark because of the many factors affecting revenues and expenses of
the airlines.
80 U. S. Civil Aeronautics Board, Recurrent Report of Financial Data.
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Many airline losses have been due in the opinion of the CAB to
errors in managerial judgment. The CAB has repeatedly said that it
will judge the wisdom of the carrier managements' decisions, and will
not make a blanket underwriting of all their losses; it has frequently
disallowed many airline expenses in mail rate cases. Obviously, the
government has a heavy stake in the airline operations, and therefore
has a heavy influence in many of the decisions that produce those
results.
These subsidy considerations, then, further remove the air trans-
portation industry from the usual free enterprise system; protection
against the acid test of bankruptcy, government power over many air-
line decisions because of direct mail payments, and the fact that the
industry is not necessarily supposed to achieve economic self-sufficiency
as of any particular time. To this extent, the thinking about competi-
tion and monopoly, carried over uncritically from the free enterprise
system, should be modified.
How Does National Defense Affect Airlines?
Another limit on the application of free enterprise theories to air
transportation is the strong national defense interest in the industry.
This industry has a double role in time of war. One is that, like
almost all other industries, it must maintain its output as a part of a
war-supporting economy; with modern war techniques, the speed of air
transport in mobilizing the country is of increasing importance. The
other role is that, unlike almost every other industry, it can be used
as an end product in direct strategic support of combat operations as
effectively as the Air Force's own transports. This use has led to the
industry being thought of by many authorities as in large part a direct
auxiliary of the military forces. 1
During the last war, the air transport industry was used in both
roles. Shortly after the United States entered the war, almost half of
the civil aircraft were requisitioned by the Army for direct military
operation. Part of the airlines' remaining planes, facilities, and person-
nel were also used for military training, special military flights, modifi-
cations of military aircraft, etc. In their role as part of the war-support-
ing economy, the airlines carried essential passengers, cargo, and mail
under a priority travel system.
Detailed plans have been drawn up for use in a possible future war.
Hundreds of long-range four-engined civil planes are to be operated in
direct support of military operations, to be modified and available to
fly military routes on 48 hours notice, to be manned and maintained
under contract by civil air carrier personnel and facilities. This is the
Civil Reserve Air Fleet plan adopted by the Departments of Defense
81 U. S. Congress, Congressional Aviation Policy Board, National Aviation
Policy (80th Congress, 2nd Session, Joint Committee Print. Washington: U. S.
Government Printing Office, 1948), pp. 4, 5.
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and Commerce and now being put into effect on a standby basis. 82
The remaining civil planes are to be allocated to essential civil routes,
to carry essential traffic as determined in wartime by an air priority
system.
Of course, air transportation is not alone in having an essential
mobilization role. Other industries are also being expanded to be
ready for war. How is air transport particularly important, then? The
answer is: the time factor. The theory of U. S. war mobilization plan-
ning is that relatively small and mobile military forces in being will
fight what is essentially a holding action, while the standby war-produc-
tion plants go into operation to turn out armaments which will throw
their power into battle months later.
However, air transport is an essential part of the initial holding
action. As a direct military adjunct it must go into operation in a
matter of hours, not months. Other industries can build up their physi-
cal plants and then leave them in "moth balls" to be manned and put
into production in a few weeks or months. Air transport cannot. If
normal competitive business considerations were to close down a part
of the air transportation system, then there would be a swift melting-
away of the managerial know-how, skilled flight personnel, trained
mechanics, meteorologists, and other specialists. In a war emergency,
all this organization and manpower could be put together again, it is
true - but it could not be done in time to provide essential support for
the initial crucial military defense and offense.
The question naturally occurs: if these planes and this organiza-
tion are so essential to the military, why doesn't the Department of
Defense build and maintain a fully adequate air transport support of
its own? The answer is economic. The military have their own air
transports - the Military Air Transport Service, the Fleet Logistics Air
Wings, the transports of the Strategic Air Command and the Troop
Carrier Command and other air transport organic to military organiza-
tions. But they do not have enough. Military funds, although huge in
amount, are not unlimited. Other military shortages also have a high
priority. The airlift portion is, like many other military resources,
inadequate in time of peace for use in all-out war. 3
It is much more economical to allocate to war uses a portion of the
civil air fleet, if in peacetime the planes earmarked for the military can
be operated at little or no governmental expense. The capital costs of
new transport aircraft are almost the same for military or civil use.
The annual operating costs per plane are somewhat lower for the
military since, despite the fact that the hourly expenses may be some-
82 U. S. Department of Defense, The Department of Defense Plan for the
Civil Reserve Air Fleet (Multilithed, 20 March, 1952).
U. S. Department of Commerce and Department of Defense, Report to the
Air Line Presidents on Civil Aviation Mobilization (Multilithed, March 26, 1952).
83 Statement of Felix E. Larkin, General Counsel, Department of Defense,
U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Proto-
type Aircraft Development (Hearings, 81st Congress, 2nd Session. Washington:
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 32.
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what higher, the total number of hours flown per plane is much
lower. The great economy of the civil fleet lies in its commercial rev-
enues which can largely or wholly offset the capital and operating costs.
Building a commercial air fleet for a ready military reserve pro-
duces a conflict in the objectives of a civil airline system, depending
upon the size of the military reserve required. A considerable expan-
sion of airlift capacity is an inherent potentiality of civil planes as they
are normally operated in peacetime. The usual utilization can be
raised 25 to 50 percent in wartime. The usual revenue load factor can
be raised by about half in wartime.
But if more military reserve is required, policy conflicts develop.
The CAB has taken the position that the development of civil air trans-
portation must be along lines that are either economically feasible or
that give promise of becoming so s* and that the establishment of a
military reservoir of aircraft in excess of reasonable economic justifica-
tion is not within the CAB's function.8 5 The Department of Defense
has stated that allocating mail pay subsidies for national defense pur-
poses is not feasible; while commercial airlift is a national defense
asset, its value is too intangible for such calculations. 6
Some people would change the existing policy. Some would have
the military accumulate a "moth ball" fleet of air transports. Some
would have the military buy planes and lease them to the carriers at a
low rental that would expand the use of the planes. Some would add
more routes and more carriers with less economic justification.
These ideas have not been generally favored. But if a business
depression came, and if competition worked itself out among the air-
lines as it has among free enterprises, with wholesales bankruptcies
and a large proportion of the facilities made idle for long periods,
then present policies might require change. The national defense in-
terest might not be able to afford a major reduction in air transporta-
tion. And this interest is one more factor that sets this industry apart
from the usual free enterprise industry.
Interpreting "Airline Competition"
"Competition" means many things to many people. It brings up
one set of ideas to an economist, another to a court or lawyer, another
to a practical businessman. It means one thing in the more competi-
tive part of the American economy, another in the more monopolistic
84 Statement of the Civil Aeronautics Board. U. S. Congress, House, Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Transportation Study (Hearings,
81st Congress, 2nd Session. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office,
1950), p. 27.
85 U. S. Civil Aeronautics Board, Transport Aircraft Production, letter from
the Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board in response to S. Res. 228, 77th
Congress, 2nd Session (Senate Doc. No. 206. Washington: U. S. Government
Printing Office, 1942), p. 3.
86 Statement of Hon. Stephen Early, Deputy Secretary of Defense. U. S.
Congress, Senate, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Air-Line
Industry Investigation (Hearings, 81st Congress, 1st Session. Washington: U. S.
Government Printing Office, 1949-1950), pp. 2036-2037.
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part, another in public utilities, and still another in the particular
public utility of air transportation. Within each of these major groups
it may mean several things to different people as it does in air trans-
portation.
The Civil Aeronautics Act, in its Declaration of Policy, states that
the public interest requires "Competition to the extent necessary to
assure the sound development of an air-transportation system .. "
In itself, this phrase means nothing. The extent of competition
necessary for sound development can be considered by various people
in the complete range from zero to complete duplication and triplica-
tion of every route, or even to the complete removal of all certificate
requirements from the Act. Its real significance is that competition is
mentioned at all.
Interpretation of competition is also complicated by the fact that
the Declaration of Policy contains other objectives which may basically
be in conflict with the competition clause: encouragement and develop-
ment of an air transportation system; regulation to promote its de-
velopment, preserve its inherent advantages, and foster sound economic
conditions; and the promotion of economical service.8 7
What is the competition mentioned in the Act? The narrowest
definition is probably that developed by the CAB. In the Board's
interpretation, competition usually means direct parallel point-to-point
service by two or more airlines that can potentially provide fairly sub-
stitutable transportation in terms of aircraft and schedules.
But there are other possible interpretations of what is meant by
competition, on a slowly broadening scale. It could mean direct com-
petition between major terminals, but via different intermediate areas:
this type was important back in 1938, but has become quite obsolete
with the advent of newer aircraft capable of making long nonstop
flights. Or competition could mean service between the same approxi-
mate areas, but not necessarily between the same cities - for example,
coast-to-coast, but not necessarily Boston-San Francisco or Washington-
Los Angeles. Or it could even be broadened a little further, as is done
in other transportation media, to markets which are competitive in
type rather than in geographical location - as vacation trips to Florida
vs. Carlsbad Caverns vs. Yellowstone Park vs. Niagara Falls.
Or it can mean the comnetitive spirit, as described by the Federal
Aviation Commission in 1935:
"There has been little direct point to point competition on iden-
tical routes, and what has existed has been comparatively unim-
portant. Of much greater benefit has been the availability of two
or more alternative routes . . . between widely separated centers.
• . . Perhaps of even greater importance, however, is the spirit of
emulation that exists even between organizations that could not
by any conceivable possibility be in direct competition with each
other."88
87 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, as amended, Sec. 2.
88 U. S. Congress, Senate, Report of the Federal Aviation Commission (Sen-
ate Doc. No. 15, 74th Congress, 1st Session. Washington: U. S. Government
Printing Office, 1935), pp. 61-62.
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Of course, the statement that direct point-to-point competition
was comparatively unimportant, it true at the time, was certainly not
true a few years later. In 1940, 25 percent of the airline passenger
travel was in markets served directly by two carriers, and 16 percent
was in markets served by three carriers.89 It was also true, in the lan-
guage of technical economists if not in the minds of practical legisla-
tors, that the industry was not one of competition, but of monopolies,
duopolies, and oligopolies.
The fact that such a large proportion of traffic was in competitive
markets - assuming that practical men might well think that if two or
three carriers serve a market it is "competitive" - may have also been
a strong reason for the clause in the Act. The "grandfather" clause
solidifying the existing route structure may have had to recognize this
as a basic element of the existing air transportation system.
Then again, broadening out still further, does competition have
to mean rivalry by means of exactly the same type of service? One of
the important conclusions reached by Gill and Bates is the very close
relation of air fares to first-class rail fares, and the strong influence on
air service of rail service °0 It is clear that the transportation net works
of the country are highly developed and offer severe competition in
convenience and in schedule frequency; that bus and rail service make
the volume of air travel negligible at distances under about 100 miles;
that overnight rail service is highly competitive up to distances of 400
or 500 miles; and that rail service is still a major competitive factor
at greater distances. Travel by private car, which vastly exceeds pas-
senger travel by all common carriers, is also competitive. It seems
obvious that competition for an airline need not necessarily be fur-
nished only by other airlines. However, this factor was probably not
of any great influence in writing the provisions of the Act.
The definition of competition must also be tightly limited by the
public utility idea. The Civil Aeronautics Act was closely patterned
on other public utility regulations, particularly upon the Act which
created the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887 to regulate rail-
road rates and service, and was broadened to regulate pipelines in 1906,
motor carriers in 1935, and water carriers in 1940.91
It is unfortunate that the words "competition" and "monopoly"
have to be used in dealing with air transportation. They drag in too
many irrelevant emotions and ideas. Yet the words are used by every-
one in speaking of this industry, and in order to remain intelligible
the same words must be used in this analysis. It would be far better
to standardize on some such hieroglyphics as HOMTOPARCUCABR,
"holders of more than one parallel air route certificate under CAB
regulatinn," and HOASUARCUCABR, "holder of a single unparal-
89 Frederick W. Gill and Gilbert L. Bates, Airline Competition (Boston:
Harvard University Printing Office, 1949), p. 27.
90 Ibid., p. 433.
91 U. S. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Gov-
ernment, Task Force Report on Regulatory Commissions (Appendix N) (Wash-
ington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 7.
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leled air route certificate under CAB regulation." These hieroglyphics
are accurate, but clumsy. They are what are generally meant by "com-
petition" and "monopoly" among the domestic airlines of the United
States.
WHAT CAN BE DONE TO REDUCE AIRLINE COMPETITION?
Suppose that it were generally agreed - by the CAB, Congress,
government and industry generally - that there is too much compe-
tition among the domestic airlines. What could be done under the
Civil Aeronautics Act to reduce it? What could be done by amending
the Act?
Under present conditions, of course, there seems little likelihood
of such a conclusion being reached. For one thing, few people realize
how much airline competition is costing the country. For another,
most people have been steeped in the traditions of the free enterprise
system, and relatively uninformed on how far removed from it are the
regulated public utilities; cries of "monopoly" would arouse in them
all the emotions rightfully applicable to the economy in general, but
not to the air transportation industry in particular. As for the airlines,
they share the opinion of most businessmen, that reduction in com-
petition is laudable when made at the expense of their competitors,
but that it is most objectionable when they are the ones to be ejected
from someone else's territory.
But there is one set of conditions which would probably force
agreement to such a program. These conditions have not occurred in
this country for more than twenty years, and no one knows when they
might happen. They are the conditions of a major business recession:
or depression. With all economic activity declining, business and
pleasure travel by air would drop rapidly, taking with them the air-
lines' commercial revenues. Government tax collections would also
go down which would normally produce a drive to cut Government
expenses - as could happen without a depression - and the subsidy
constituting the government guarantee of airline solvency might be
slashed drastically.
The airlines would then have a choice between major retrench-
ment and bankruptcy. Like most other businessmen under compulsion
of these unpleasant alternatives, they would probably choose retrench-
ment even if it meant a major amputation of routes. The government
regulatory agencies would have the choice between a plan for reduc-
tion and the chaos of uncoordinated cuts. The CAB, if it had time,
would probably choose a planned reduction.
A number of possible methods are available to reduce airline
competition. Some have been suggested in the past for helping cure
whatever was believed to be wrong with the airline route pattern, and
some have not. Some are purely voluntary on the part of the airlines,
and some could be imposed by the CAB only over airline opposition.
Some powers conferred under the Civil Aeronautics Act have been
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used, and some have not. Some methods would require changes in
the Act.
Route Planning
Route planning has been favored, and lack of route planning has
been criticized by a large number of authorities in the aviation field:
the President's Air Policy Commission, 2 the Congressional Aviation
Policy Board,93 a task force of the U. S. Commission on Organization
of the Executive Branch of the Government (Hoover Commission) ,
the Department of Commerce,95 a number of airline presidents, and
others.
"Route planning" means all things to all men. Although it means
arriving at some fixed conclusions about the most important policies
in air transportation, that is where agreement ends. When it comes to
embodying specific policies in a specific plan, the planners are for or
against the plan depending upon whose ideas it embodies.
Route planning is a complex task. Competition is only one of the
problems to be settled. Other problems with important effects on the
air transportation system include the relative economic strengths of the
planned airlines, the limits in size of towns and density of routes to
be served, the size and use of direct and indirect subsidies, and the
general level and structure of fares.
Route planning has many advantages when the control agency must
take action, planned or unplanned, and the only real choice is whether
the decisions will follow a consistent pattern or not. The Hoover Com-
mission task force report said that:
the opinions of the Board in individual route cases do not reveal a
consistent set of principles. The Board's case-by-case judicial pro-
cedure, without basic planning, leaves much to be desired as a
method for directing the growth of a Nation-wide route pattern. 98
It then went on to recommend studies and analyses on
... the proper number of trunk-line carriers, the extent of com-
petition, the economics of feeder-line service, the optimum size of
air-line systems, classification of services, frequencies of sched-
ules, and the principles to govern one-carrier, single-plane and
skip-stop service.9 7
One former CAB chairman believes that an overall national plan
puts the cart before the horse.98 He believes that planning should
92 U. S. President's Air Policy Commission, Survival in the Air Age (Wash-
ington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1948), pp. 110-111.
93 U. S. Congress, Congressional Aviation Policy Board, National Aviation
Policy, p. 26.
94 U. S. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Gov-
ernment, op. cit., p. 78.
95 W. Averell Harriman, Secretary of Commerce, Statement to the Presi-
dent's Air Policy Commission (mimeographed, November 26, 1947), p. 18.
96 U. S. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Gov-
ernment, loc. cit.
97 Ibid.
98 James M. Landis "Air Routes Under the Civil Aeronautics Act," 15 JRL. OF
AIR LAW & COM. 299 (Summer, 1948).
COMPETITION AMONG DOMESTIC TRUNK AIRLINES
center around the specific airline system, and should proceed with
individual airline expansions or contractions or mergers in view of
available traffic resources. He believes that the weaknesses of the pres-
ent system are mainly those of inherently weak routes and of the
integration of routes into weak airline systems,99 without mention of
the fact that competition contributes to the weaknesses.
Another former CAB chairman believes that there are only about
three types of competitive situations to be corrected.100 One is where
a weaker carrier has been given a route directly paralleling the route
of a stronger carrier with whose schedules he cannot compete. Another
is where a small carrier competes over a dense but short route segment
where the short hauls make profitable operation almost impossible
when coupled with heavy competition. The other is where there are
just too many competitors, which instances number only about three.
These are only two views on how to attack the route planning
problem. Others would be brought out by further investigation. As a
matter of fact, airline difficulties produce many investigations. The
recent airline recession beginning in 1947 started a series. The Presi-
dent's Air Policy Commission began late in the year, followed soon by
the Congressional Air Policy Board. In 1948 the Hoover Commission,
which was investigating the organization of the government, itudied
the CAB's organization and procedures. In the next year, the Senate
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee held hearings which pro-
duced a record of more than 2500 printed pages. The CAB began sev-
eral investigations of its own into specific instances of possibly excessive
competition. It directed its staff to prepare a comprehensive and com-
plete analysis of the domestic route pattern,10 1 which finally became a
study of cost standards by which to measure route changes. 10 2
Fortunately for the airlines, government subsidies were available
for the period of the brief airline recession, business soon picked up,
and the Korean war shot the airlines up into unprecedented profits.
Nothing very important came of the investigations.
If another recession should be general throughout the American
economy and not just local to air transportation, and if it should last
a fairly long time, something would have to happen. For that time, it
would be well for the airlines and the government agencies to be aware
of the real cost of airline competition, and have ready an outline plan
of how to reduce it. Then the investigations might well center upon
such a plan, and they might result in specific action to realign the air
route pattern.
99 Ibid., p. 295.
100 Joseph J. O'Connell, Jr., "Legal Problems in Revising the Air Route Pat-
tern," 15 JRL. OF AIR LAW & CoM. 400 (Autumn, 1948).
101 U. S. Civil Aeronautics Board, Annual Report, 1948 (Washington: U. S.
Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 4.
102 F. H. Crozier, Cost Standards-Domestic Scheduled Air Carriers (Wash-
ington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1950).
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
Route Suspension, Revocation, or Purchase
There are three methods by which the CAB can eliminate routes
from a carrier's operation, and thereby eliminate competition - sus-
pension, revocation, and purchase. The first of these, route suspension,
is authorized by the Act. Another, route revocation, is not possible
under the Act except under very unlikely conditions, and cannot be
exercised if its only justification is that the public convenience and
necessity no longer require the operation. Of course, if a carrier re-
quests suspension or revocation on its own initiative, the CAB could
approve it, but this action is unlikely in the highly competitive situa-
tions where it is most needed. The third method, route purchase,
would probably require special Congressional action.
Many people oppose the granting to the CAB of power to revoke
certificates, and oppose the exercise of the power to suspend certifi-
cates as a long step on the road toward revocation. They believe that
such power would destroy the stability of an industry founded upon
permanent certificates. They feel that the industry could not plan
ahead with any sense of security, that the certificate would become a
temporary permit rather than a permanent right, and that investment
funds would be much more difficult to obtain and would be at a much
higher price.
On the other hand, many people feel that permanent certificates
have some major disadvantages. They are granted for the reason that
the public convenience and necessity are believed to require them;
if the need for them changes, or if their results are uneconomic, there
should be some way to change the route pattern. Their continuation
can be costly to the Government which is permanently pledged to keep
the certificated routes financially sound; their continuation can be
costly to the public in higher fares based on higher costs.
The power of revocation need not be permanently granted to the
CAB. Under the pressure of a major business recession, and for a lim-
ited period, it might be granted as an alternative to complete unplanned
bankruptcy and chaos.
The CAB has suspension powers now, under Section 401 (h) of the
Act.10 3 The CAB has interpreted its powers as meaning the right to
suspend for an indefinite time, with only a fine legal distinction be-
tween suspension and revocation:
Those who argue that the Board is without authority to suspend
the entire certificate ... first contend that a suspension as proposed
herein is not really a suspension but a revocation or an abandon-
ment. Although from the standpoint of potential users of service
the end result of abandonment, suspension, or revocation may be
exactly the same, i.e., loss of service, these three are not necessarily
the same. Abandonment and revocation both have the attribute of
103 "The Authority, upon petition or complaint or upon its own initiative,
after notice and hearing, may alter, amend, modify, or suspend any such cer-
tificate, in whole or in part, if the public convenience and necessity so require."
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finality, while suspension permits possible return to the original
status ... 104
As for the fact that suspension need not specify a fixed time after which
it would cease to be effective, the CAB said:
The exact time at which we should order the suspension to be
ended cannot and need not be specified at this time. The deter-
mination that the public convenience and necessity require sus-
pension is based on facts which are subject to change. . . . The
suspension should continue as long as the factors presently requir-
ing such suspension remain substantially unchanged, and should be
terminated whenever it is demonstrated to the Board that circum-
stances have changed in such manner that suspension of all or part
of the certificate is no longer required by the public convenience
and necessity.1 05
This decision was not tested in the courts, since concurrently with
the suspension the carrier in the case was granted another certificate.
Where a major route would be suspended, a court fight might result.
During the recent airline recession, the CAB took specific action
toward possible suspension of competitive routes. In its Economic
Program of 1949, the CAB instituted three route segment investiga-
tions, one for Washington-Detroit-Twin Cities, one for Washington-
Chicago, and one for New York-Detroit. 06 Concerning these investi-
gations, the CAB said that they were designed to lessen excessive com-
petition and bring about a more rational corporate and route struc-
ture in the industry, and that since the industry was generally unwilling
to suspend on a voluntary basis, the CAB would devote increasing
attention to such actions.107 Only the first of these cases went to hear-
ing, and in the middle of 1952 the CAB dismissed the proceeding.108
The CAB also started other actions which might have resulted in
route suspensions. In March and April 1947, it issued orders institut-
ing investigations of the finances, routes, and operations of five air-
lines. The carriers filed special reports, and the CAB staff made field
studies of the carriers. But the CAB then found itself faced with mail
rate cases necessary to keep the carriers solvent, and diverted its staff
from the investigations to the rate cases. The reports became out-of-
date, and economic conditions improved. All the investigations were
finally dismissed.100
The present power of the CAB to revoke certificates is extremely
limited under the Act. It can be exercised only when a carrier inten-
104 10 CAB 24, All American Airways, Inc., Suspension Case, decided Jan-
uary 11, 1949, p. 27.
105 Ibid., p. 35.
106 CAB Orders E-2480, E-2481, and E-2482, February 21, 1949.
107 U. S. Civil Aeronautics Board, Annual Report, 1949 (Washington: U. S.
Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 5.
108 CAB Order E-6604, Through Service Investigation Twin Cities-Washing-
ton-Detroit-Washington, decided July 14, 1952.
109 Chicago and Southern case closed by CAB Order E-1783, July 12, 1948,
Capital and Colonial cases closed by 11 CAB 307, May 29, 1950; Western case
closed by CAB Order E-5292, April 16, 1951; Northeast case closed by CAB Order
E-6026, January 11, 1952.
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tionally fails to comply with an order of the CAB and continues its
failure to comply after the CAB issues an order commanding obedi-
ence.110 Such action seems to be most unlikely.
Opinions differ on the advisability of the power to revoke certifi-
cates. In its statement before the President's Air Policy Commission
in October 1947, the CAB said:
It is the opinion of the Board that the Act should be amended so
as to rest in the Board authority to revoke existing certificates in
any case in which the public convenience and necessity require such
action. Experience under the Act has convinced the Board that the
existing airline route pattern is in some respects not well adapted
to the development of an adequate air transportation system, and
that if such a system is to be assured some realignment of the exist-
ing route pattern of the certificated carriers is essential....
Inevitably some of the awards made by the Board, on the basis of
available historical data and estimates, will prove to be uneconomic
and unwise in the light of actual operations. Moreover, some of
these cases which in retrospect appear to have been sound decisions
on the basis of conditions existing at the time may prove to be of
questionable wisdom because of subsequent changes in the technol-
ogy of air transportation and general business conditions.11
Evidently there was no unanimity of opinion, even in the CAB.
The chairman said later, when he was longer with the CAB:
My own view is that, since public convenience and necessity was the
basis for the issuance of a certificate, the absence of public conven-
ience and necessity should be ground for its termination. But this
view was opposed by my colleagues and found no favor with the
President's Air Policy Commission.11 2
The incoming chairman of the CAB also disagreed with this pre-
vious position:
At least until we have found that the other tools which we possess
are inadequate to do the kind of realignment of the route structure
which must be done, I am not personally disposed to request the
Congress for power to revoke a certificate other than for cause.
But I would not be bashful about requesting the power because of
any theories which may exist with respect to the sanctity in per-
petuity of a certificate of public convenience and necessity.113
He later testified to the same opinion before a Senate committee, and
110 "The Authority, upon petition or complaint or upon its own initiative,
after notice and hearing, may... revoke any such certificate, in whole or in part,
for intentional failure to comply with any provision of this title or any order,
rule, or regulation issued hereunder or any term, condition, or limitation of such
certificate; Provided, that no such certificate shall be revoked unless the holder
thereof fails to comply, within a reasonable time to be fixed by the Authority,
with an order of the Authority commanding obedience to the provision, or to the
order (other than an order issued in accordance with this proviso), rule, regula-
tion, term, condition, or limitation found by the Authority to have been violated."
(Section 401h of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, as amended.)
111 U. S. Civil Aeronautics Board, Statement of Civil Aeronautics Board
Before the President's Air Policy Commission, October 27, 1947, pp. 203-205.
112 James M. Landis, op. cit., p. 297.
113 Joseph J. O'Connell, Jr., op. cit., p. 405.
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said that in doing so "I am sure I express the feeling of the
Board ... "114
Another way of readjustment of the route pattern by eliminating
routes, possible under the existing Act but not probable except with
specific appropriations beforehand by Congress, is for the CAB to buy
out route certificates. This was suggested by a preliminary study made
for the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.11 5
The principle underlying this suggestion is that the government would
be better off if it made a single and final payment for an uneconomic
route and closed it down, rather than to continue to support it indefi-
nitely through mail payments.
Suppose, for example - and this carrier is selected only as illustra-
tive of a number of company situations and not as a specific recom-
mendation - that Capital Airlines' entire operation were under
consideration. For the five-year period 1947-1951, mail payments to
this carrier aggregated over $17,500,000. About 6,100,000 ton-miles
of mail were carried; at a service rate of 45 cents per ton-mile this would
have cost the government $2,750,000; at 53 cents per ton-mile, it would
have cost $3,250,000; at 75 cents, it would have cost $4,500,000. The
airline's 1951 service mail rate was 53 cents; the service rate of most
of its competitors in the same year was 45 cents. Undoubtedly the
service rate for the earlier years would have been higher, but it is
doubtful that if the mail had been routed via competitors for the entire
period, the rate would have exceeded 75 cents. The net subsidy cost
to the government of this carrier for the five-year period, then, was
at least $13,000,000.
The net worth of the company, using the average at the end of
each of the five years, was $2,140,000. The five-year subsidy was there-
fore sufficient to buy out the net worth of the company more than
six times. The average depreciated cost of property and equipment,
without counting any offsetting liabilities, was about $8,650,000 for
the period. The subsidy mail payment was therefore sufficient to buy
the entire physical plant of the company one and one-half times.
Obviously, it would have paid the government, purely on a cash basis
and disregarding all other considerations, to purchase the company and
close up its routes, even at a considerably inflated price.
Many of the airlines would show a similar result for the same
period. If the process were broken down more finely, to deal only with
particular routes, the results would be similar. Of course, this one
illustration includes many light-traffic routes which run at heavy deft-
114 Testimony of Joseph J. O'Connell, Jr., Chairman, CAB. U. S. Congress,
Senate, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Air-Line Industry
Investigation, p. 58.
15,"Ernst & Ernst Pilot Study, setting forth methods of compensation for
carriage of domestic air mail for the operation of air transportation service
essential to the public interest." Letter of January 18, 1950, from Ernst & Ernst
to Hon. Edwin C. Johnson, Chairman, Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce. Air-Line Industry Investigation, pp. 2167-2168.
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cits, but the principle is clear even for competitive routes which are
usually of high traffic density.
The problem of a fair price to be paid would be a great one. There
is the argument that, since the government granted the certificate as a
gift, no purchaser of the route should be required to pay for the
franchise value. There is the opposing argument that, if sales of routes
are to be made voluntarily, there must be the incentive of a profit over
the value of the physical property sold.
The CAB and its individual members have varied on these ques-
tions. In the first formal case that came before the Board in 1940, the
Board disapproved the purchase on the basis of price, stating that it
was clearly adverse to the public interest to allow a certificate to be sold
to the highest bidder as if it were a speculative security.116 Half a year
later, the CAB approved the purchase, justifying a price for the ex-
change of property greater than the value for rate-making purposes."17
In the next major case with the issue of price, in 1947, the CAB
held that a commercial profit on the sale of a route was justified as
an incentive to improve the route pattern. The CAB held that this
inducement was in line with the economic laws and business motives
of a free economy, that there was no direct or indirect means of forcing
a carrier to transfer its route against its will, and that trying to pressure
a carrier by indirect means would be one of the gravest mistakes the
Board could make." 8 The chairman dissented, stating that such ap-
proval was an invitation to carriers to wait for the highest bidder and
that the public would inevitably pay for the inflated price; he believed
that the price should be a basis for charging a lack of economy that
would justify a reduction in government subsidy payments."19
Most recently, in 1950, the Board in effect reversed its 1947 stand.
In 1947 it had allowed a subsidy-rate carrier to sell a route at more
than its physical property value. But then in the subsequent mail rate
case it counted the profit from the route sale as an offset against subsidy
need, so that the profit accrued not to the carrier but to the govern-
ment. It repeated the pre-1947 arguments that route changes should
not be conditioned on profitable route sales, and that such a ruling
should not prevent a carrier from making a route sale. 20 Six months
later, however, the CAB again reversed its position, and held that the
carrier should be allowed to keep the net profit from the sale of the
intangibles "which the Board found to be composed almost entirely
of the earning power of the route, because it was the latter factor which
played the decisive part in the route transfer," and in so doing the
Board stated that it was "thus seeking to encourage improvement of
116 2 CAB 1, Acquisition of Marquette by TWA, decided July 3, 1940, p. 14.
117 2 CAB 409, Acquisition of Marquette by TWA, Supplemental Opinions,
decided December 18, 1940, p. 412.
118 8 CAB 298, United Air Lines, Inc.-Western Air Lines, Inc., Acquisition
of Air Carrier Property, decided August 25, 1947, p. 323.
119 Ibid., Dissent of James M. Landis, pp. 341-342.
120 CAB Order E-4870, Western Air Lines, Inc. and Inland Air Lines, Inc.
Mail Rates, decided November 24, 1950, pp. 17-18.
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the air route pattern through voluntary route transfers by other car-
riers."121
As a matter of standard public utility regulation, allowing profits
on route transfers has arguments on both sides. It would seem to be a
practical approach, especially in time of general business recession, for
the CAB to offer to purchase competitive routes which otherwise would
cost the Government far more in a few years of subsidy payments. It
would also seem advisable for the carriers to sell at a reasonable figure,
particularly if there were imminent threat of mail payments disappear-
ing under the Congressional axe.
A major realignment of the air route structure of the United States,
through a major program of route revocations, need not necessarily
result in a reduction in the total number of carriers. It would normally
be based upon the concept of producing a system of regional monopo-
lies rather than a system composed of only a few carriers or a single
giant company. Of course, at the same time there might also be a
change in the number of carriers, but such action would be based upon
considerations other than competition.
The net result, if all other things remained the same, would be to
retain the gross traffic volume of each carrier, although such an out-
come could not be achieved exactly for every carrier. Each would have
its route mileage reduced. The density of traffic would therefore in-
crease proportionately. It is the rise in this factor which would be most
favorable to the economic condition of any carrier.
Interchange
An equipment interchange is an agreement between two or more
carriers by which the plane of one carrier can continue on a through
flight over the routes of the others. In all cases, full operational control
and responsibility pass to the carrier over whose route the plane is
flying.1 22
Ordinarily, each carrier provides planes in approximate propor-
tion to the mileage flown over its own routes. However, one carrier
can provide all the planes and the other may merely lease them, or one
carrier can provide the planes for a period of time alternately with the
other carrier. There is no necessary requirement as to the percentage
of contribution of each.
121 CAB Order E-5467, Opinion and order disposing of exceptions in Western
Air Lines, Inc. and Inland Air Lines, Inc. Mail Rates, decided June 26, 1951,
pp. 8, 9.
122 A typical contract provides that the carrier with the route certificate
will have:
"responsibility for operation, dispatch, flight plane clearance, radio plane
guard, and 'in-flight' instructions, and all communications, navigation, and
weather facilities and services, and also for loading and discharge of air-
planes, handling of traffic and passenger service ... establish schedules ...
inspect aircraft ... crews will be qualified and included under the operations
specifications . . . and will utilize . . .route manual, operations manual and
aircraft manual.., authority to cancel a flight, turn it back, delay or reroute
it for operational reasons."
(8 CAB 50, Pan American-Panagra Agreement, decided May 5, 1947, pp. 53-54.
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Usually, each carrier provides its own crews for flight over its own
routes, and the crews change at the route junction point. However, one
carrier can provide all the crews just as it may provide all the planes,
and in effect charter a number of regularly scheduled trips to the other.
Revenues and expenses are usually charged to each carrier sepa-
rately, with the lessee keeping all revenues from traffic moving over its
own routes, and paying the lessor a price per plane-mile by a method
specified in a contract. However, any sort of formula can be agreed
upon for dividing revenues and expenses in any sort of reasonable
ratios.
The first interchange approved was in 1940 between United and
Western, so that transcontinental sleeper planes could continue on the
routes of both carriers without disturbing passengers for change of
planes at the route junction point. This interchange operated until the
sleeper planes were requisitioned for military service during the war.
The first postwar domestic interchange was authorized at the end
of 1947, and by the end of 1953, 9 carriers were operating 19 daily
interchange round trips serving 51 cities.1 23
Interchanges have practically all the advantages of new route cer-
tifications, and few of the disadvantages. They provide the public
with through service that can be increased or decreased as the traffic
warrants. They add negligibly to costs other than those usually incurred
by increases in flight frequencies and traffic, because there are no more
new stations opened by more carriers, no additional flight costs other
than route familiarization, and very little additional crew training if
the type of aircraft is one already flown by each participating carrier.
The use of interchanges could have prevented a large amount of
duplication in the route structure of the airlines. Several people have
said that if interchanges had been used on a wider scale earlier, the
routes would today be much stronger.124 Of course, as long as the CAB
was granting duplicate new routes, the carriers trying to expand into
another's area stressed the advantages of new route grants, and kept
away from any suggestion of interchange.
It is now recognized that interchanges can be an important means
of avoiding more competition in the future. The CAB has called this
the most promising alternative to the granting of new route mileage.
2 5
One former CAB chairman has said that interchanges could help solve
the problem of a weak carrier paralleled by a short route of a large
carrier, 12 6 and another has said that "the real possibilities for improved
air service in the next decade lie less in the extension of routes than in
the development of combined through services. '" 1
27
12.1 Official Airline Guide, December 1953.
124 C. R. Smith, President, American Airlines and Senator Edwin C. John-
son. Air-Line Industry Investigation, pp. 785, 2157.
125 Statement of the CAB. U. S. Conaress, House, Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, Transportation Study, p. 19.
126 Joseph J. O'Connell, Jr., op. cit., pp. 406-407.
127 James M. Landis, Mutual Problems on Air Transport Service, an address
before a General Session of the American Municipal Association (New Orleans:
mimeographed, November 6, 1947), p. 5.
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Almost all the thinking about interchanges in relation to compe-
tition has been quite negative. Interchanges have been thought of as
a means for slowing down the increase in competition. They have not
been thought of, generally, as a way to reduce competition in combina-
tion with other measures.
Suppose, for example, that the CAB had found in the Twin Cities-
Washington through service investigation - as it did not - that the
point-to-point parallel competition of Northwest and Capital was un-
economic on the route Minneapolis-Milwaukee-Detroit-Cleveland-
Pittsburgh-Washington. In that proceeding Public Counsel exhibits
showed that the competition between the two airlines cost in the neigh-
borhood of $2,000,000 for the two subsidy carriers during the twelve
months ended September 30, 1949.128 The CAB could have suspended
Capital north of Detroit and Northwest south of Detroit, left the pub-
lic with adequate through service via an interchange between the two
carriers at Detroit, and in one single proceeding have saved the public
some two million dollars in mail pay per year.
If used in connection with some other power, such as suspension
or revocation or purchase of route certificates, interchanges could be
an effective help in eliminating the costs of competition without lessen-
ing public convenience.
It should be noted that the CAB has the power to compel inter-
changes. Section 404 (a) of the Civil Aeronautics Act provides that
"It shall be the duty of every air carrier ... to provide reasonable
through service in such air transportation in connection with other
air carriers; to provide safe and adequate service, equipment, and
facilities in connection with such transportation."
Consolidation and Route Transfer
Consolidations and route transfers have frequently been mentioned
as major methods of changing the airline route structure. This section
is not meant to be an exhaustive study of the consolidation and merger
problem, but analyzes it only as far as such methods might or might not
be suitable to reduce airline competition.
Perhaps it might be well to start with a brief review of another
transportation industry which has had a fairly long history of the con-
solidation problem - the railroads. Although the railroad and airline
systems are by no means comparable, a case study of the one throws
considerable light on the other.
The Transportation Act of 1920 required that the Interstate Com-
merce Commission prepare a complete plan for the consolidation of
the railroads in a limited number of systems. 129 In doing so, the ICC
was to preserve competition as much as possible, maintain existing
routes and channels of trade where practicable, and produce railroad
128 CAB Docket No. 3661, Exhibit P. C. Reb. 1 (Revised).
129 This and the following paragraph are based on Marvin L. Fair and Ernest
W. Williams. Jr., Economics of Transportation (New York: Harper & Brothers,
1950), pp. 659-660.
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systems that if possible could earn approximately equal rates of return
at a unitorm system of rates.
A report was made in 1921 recommending consolidation of all rail-
roads into nineteen systems. There were extensive hearings, and in
1929 the ICC finally approved a plan for twenty-one systems. Then
came the depression, and little was done toward consolidations in line
with the approved plan. In 1940 Congress passed the Transportation
Act of 1940 which abandoned the idea of requiring consolidations to
fit into an overall plan of the ICC.
The major objectives of consolidation were to replace many weak
lines with fewer systems of fairly equal competitive strength, and to
improve the entire system by operating economies. Mergers would
eliminate the problem of weak and strong lines; otherwise, if weak
lines were retained, rates sufficient to maintain them would produce
excessive profits for the stronger lines; rates low enough to produce
reasonable returns for the stronger lines would bankrupt the weaker
ones. Operating economies were believed to include the reduction of
overhead expenses, elimination of circuitous routings, greater utiliza-
tion, better seasonal protection, greater standardization, savings in
quantity purchases, higher load factors, simplification of regulation,
and improvement of railroad credit and the market for securities. 130
A study made of railways in 1933 estimated that a reduction in costs
of 68 million dollars could be made solely through the elimination of
competitive passenger limited trains, converting a deficit of 41 million
dollars to a profit of 27 million dollars.'8 '
The failure of the railroad consolidation plan has been attributed
by various people to various things. One is that the plan had to con-
form to the impractical conditions of preserving competition, creating
systems of equal strength, and maintaining traffic in existing channels.
Another is that a small number of regional systems is inferior to a
large number of competitive systems. Another is that the general plan
could not possibly conform to the ambitions of various carriers and the
personal interests of their managements. Another is that the plan was
voluntary rather than compulsory.
The idea of airline mergers is not new; there is a fairly long history
of such cases. The CAB has stated what it considers to be among the
principal factors in determining whether a merger or consolidation is
in the public interest: Will it "result in an integrated and coordinated
system adapted to a normal flow of air traffic?" Will it "facilitate more
economical and efficient services?" Will it "result in creating a monop-
oly and therehy result in restraining competition or jeopardize another
air carrier?"'13 2
13o Association of American Railroads, Railroad Committee for the Study of
Transportation, Consolidation of Railroads (Washington: Association of Ameri-
can Railroads, 1945), pp. 2-3.
131 U. S. Federal Coordinator of Transportation, Section of Transportation
Service, Passenger Traffic Report (Washington: U. S. Federal Coordinator of
Transportation, 1935), p. 82.
132 11 CAB 33, Monarch-Challenger Merger Case, decided November 16, 1949,
p. 85.
COMPETITION AMONG DOMESTIC TRUNK AIRLINES
In practice, the CAB seems to have given primary attention only
to the last of these. Its principles seem to have been to prevent large
carriers from becoming larger except for very minor additions, to en-
courage small and medium-sized carriers to merge so as to make larger
but fewer systems, and to give only secondary considerations to physical
integration and operating economies.
There have been three major cases involving mergers of large
carriers which would reduce competition. The first was the initial
United-Western merger case, in which a transcontinental with entry
into three of the four large west coast cities wanted access to the fourth
when no other carrier had entry to more than two; the CAB dis-
approved, stating that "Such an increase in the size and control of
United in this large area would adversely affect the existing competitive
opportunities for Western business. .. ."1,3 In the Alaska-Cordova
case, the CAB disapproved because Alaska Airlines "which already has
access to all of Interior Alaska except the Copper River district would
further increase that carrier's overwhelming competitive advantage in
the territory ... "134 In the American-Mid-Continent case, the CAB
found that there was no integration of traffic flows, and that the merger
would divert excessive traffic "and would impair the competition we
deem requisite to assure the development and maintenance of an ade-
quate air transportation system"'8 5 thereby making the largest airline
in the country still larger.
The CAB has approved of small additions to large carriers, as in
the TWA-Marquette case where a large transcontinental line absorbed
a small one to obtain entry into Detroit,136 and the United-Catalina
case where another large transcontinental acquired a lease for oper-
ating into Catalina Island about 30 miles off the California coast."8 7
It has generally approved of merging local service lines such as in the
Monarch-Challenger case, 18 Arizona-Monarch case, 8 9 and West Coast-
Empire case, 140 this latter one after disapproving one of the carriers
merging with another local service carrier in the West Coast-Southwest
case.' 4' It has also approved of the merging of small or medium-sized
133 1 CAA 739, United Air Lines Transport Corporation-Acquisition of
Western Air Express Corporation, decided June 19, 1940, p. 746.
"34 4 CAB 708, Acquisition of Cordova Air Service, Inc., by Alaska Airlines,
Inc., decided June 27, 1944, p. 712.
135 7 CAB 365, American Airlines, Inc., Acquisition of Control of Mid-Con-
tinent Airlines, Inc., decided September 27, 1946, p. 379.
136 2 CAB 409, Acquisition of Marquette by TWA, Supplemental Opinions,
decided December 18, 1940.
137 6 CAB 1041, United Air Lines, Operation of Catalina Air Transport,
decided June 3, 1946.
138 11 CAB 33, Monarch-Challenger Merger case, decided December 16, 1949.
139 11 CAB 246, Arizona-Monarch Merger Case, decided April 10, 1950.
140 CAB Order E-6550, West Coast-Empire Merger Case, decided June 27,
1952.
'4' CAB Order E-5594, Southwest-West Coast Merger Case, decided August
7, 1951.
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lines, such as Western-Inland, 142 Northeast-Mayflower, 14 3 Braniff-Mid-
Continent, 1 4 and Delta-C & S.145
The principle of physical integration of operations and of traffic
flows has been quite secondary, and inconsistently applied. The CAB
approved the Western-Inland merger, even though it said the system
would not produce a "geographically integrated corporate pattern."146
It pointed out that Northeast and Mayflower interchanged passengers
at Boston.1 7 Then it disapproved a proposed National-Caribbean-
Atlantic merger, partly because of price and partly because of ". . . no
fusion of physical properties in a contiguous area ... no development
of an integrated and coordinated air transportation system." '4  Part
of the reason given for disapproving the American-Mid-Continent
acquisition was that there was no integration of traffic flows. In approv-
ing of the first feeder merger, the Monarch-Challenger case, the CAB
gave as one of its three principal criteria, the condition that a merger
should result in an integrated and coordinated system adapted to a
normal flow of air traffic, and then in the next feeder merger case,
Arizona-Monarch, it said that because these two carriers were feeders,
"under these circumstances it is not essential that the routes of two
companies be complementary.' 149
Route transfers have been few. The outstanding one was the
transfer of Western's Los Angeles-Denver route to United to give that
transcontinental its long-desired direct entry into Los Angeles, and
the transfer from TWA to the local service line Bonanza of a small
route of local service character.15 0
In only one case did the CAB propose to break up an entire system
and redistribute its routes among other carriers. At the time of the
CAB's proposed order in September 1948, National Airlines was in
poor financial condition. It had just gone through the airline reces-
sion, had its new DC-6's grounded, and had a long pilot's strike. The
CAB began an investigation to determine whether the carrier should
be "dismembered," by transferring its main east coast route to Pan
American, its local Florida-New Orleans route to Delta, and its Havana
and Key West route to Eastern and Delta. After the investigation was
ordered, the airline recession ended, the DC-6's were flying again, and
the strike ceased. Soon the carrier was on the upgrade; in 1950 it
earned a net operating income before taxes of $2,470,000 (including
142 4 CAB 654, Western Air Lines, Inc., Acquisition of Inland Air Lines, Inc.,
May 23, 1944.
143 4 CAB 680 Acquisition of Mayflower Airlines, Inc., by Northeast Air-
lines. Inc., decided June 12, 1944.
144 CAB Order E-6459, Braniff-Mid-Continent Merger Case, decided May
26, 1952.
145 CAB Order E-7052, Delta-Chicago & Southern Merger Case, decided De-
cember 24, 1952.
1464 CAB 654, p. 661.
1474 CAB 680, p. 684.
148 6 CAB 671, National-Carribbean-Atlantic Control Case, decided March 1,
1946, p. 676.
149 11 CAB 246, p. 247.
1.10 1  CAB 893, Bonanza Air Lines, Inc.-Transcontinental and Western Air,
Inc., Route Authorization Transfer, decided November 10, 1949.
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mail pay of $1,748,000) and in 1951 it earned a net operating income
before taxes of $5,447,000 (including mail pay of $1,087,000) .151 Early
in 1951 the CAB dismissed the investigation. 5 2
There are a number of difficulties in the way of obtaining desir-
able mergers. One is that under existing law they are voluntary, and
the carrier's proposals might only coincidentally fit in with an overall
plan. Debate has been vigorous as to whether or not the CAB should
be given powers for compulsory mergers, with a majority against it.
Another difficulty is that, with a guarantee of mail payments against
long-term losses, the airlines are lacking in the usually powerful motive
of fear of bankruptcy. Another is the natural disinclination of the top
managements of airlines to negotiate themselves out of their own jobs
and positions of power.
But the main objection to mergers as a means for reducing competi-
tion is that they tend more often to increase competition than to
decrease it. For example, when the American-Mid-Continent merger
was disapproved, the CAB said that the combination would divert too
much traffic from other carriers, that is, that its competitive impact
would increase. In the Braniff-Mid-Continent merger which was ap-
proved, minor competition was eliminated between Kansas City and
Houston, but additional competition was created in the markets of
Chicago-Tulsa, Chicago-Joplin, Joplin-San Antonio, San Antonio-
St. Louis and others.15 3 The Delta-Chicago & Southern merger in-
creased competition by the merged company against American between
Dallas/Fort Worth on the one hand and Chicago, Detroit, Memphis,
and St. Louis on the other; against Braniff in the Fort Worth/Dallas-
Chicago market; and against Eastern between Detroit, Toledo and
Fort Wayne on the north and Cincinnati, Atlanta, Jacksonville, and
Miami on the south 54
Carriers that apply for mergers normally believe that the combina-
tion will improve their competitive strength. Rarely does a merger
involve parallel routes between the applicants. Never has a route trans-
fer been requested for the sole purpose of eliminating a direct com-
petitor from the operation. In fact, the Civil Aeronautics Act has been
interpreted as specifically prohibiting such actions in Section 408 (b) :
". The Authority shall not approve any consolidation, merger, pur-
chase, lease, operating contract, or acquisition of control which would
result in creating a monopoly or monopolies and thereby restrain
competition...." Obviously, if mergers and route transfers were to
be used to reduce competition, this section of the Act would have to be
amended or drastically reinterpreted.
Pooling and Regulation of Capacity
Pooling is a means of voluntary agreement to reduce competitive
pressure. In transnortation, it usually covers routes for which each
151 U. S. Civil Aeronautics Board. Recurrent Report of Financial Data.
152 rA R Order E-5205, National Route Investigation, decided March 16, 1951.
153 CAB Order E-6459.
154 Examiner's Report attached to CAB Order E-7052.
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carrier agrees substantially to bear the costs of his own schedules, but
all revenues are placed in a common fund (pool) to be divided on an
agreed percentage basis.
Pooling among air carriers is legal under Section 412 of the Civil
Aeronautics Act when approved by the CAB. However, the CAB is
opposed to pooling:
Pooling agreements like other agreements which tend to elimi-
nate competition generally are contrary to the public interest, except
in unusual circumstances ... we do not deem it appropriate to take
any action at this time which would indicate approval even in prin-
ciple of pooling agreements. .. .15
Pooling has the advantage of cutting excess scheduled capacity,
since the participants in the pool generally schedule flights as would
a single management. Pooling has a disadvantage in its instability
except under special conditions. One great difficulty in reaching even
an initial agreement is determining the percentage division of the
revenues in the pool. 1 6 Even after the agreement is made, it may not
be renewed. If any participant feels that he is becoming stronger, he
becomes discontented with his share of the pool. He may be financially
better off than the others, and able to afford new aircraft, more sched-
ules, more intensive salesmanship, or more low-fare flights. He might
then drop out of the pool, and the route would be wide open to
competitive practices again. If he has such opinions in the beginning,
of course, the pool will not even be formed.
Water transportation has had conference agreements for some time
and pooling has been authorized. But some of the competitors on a
trade route have refused to join; with changing economic and com-
petitive conditions the agreements have been broken, followed by rate
wars and heavy losses, and after experience with these sad financial
results, new agreements.1 57
Pooling among the railroads has been legal since 1920, but the
privilege has been practically neglected. This has been partly because
mergers could eliminate competition more surely, and partly because
the ICC was given the power to fix minimum rates which lessened the
penalty of competition, but mainly because the carriers were psycho-
logically attuned to their traditional competitive strategy15 8 The ICC
155 8 CAB 50, Pan American-Panagra Agreement, decided May 5, 1947, p. 61.
156 Eliot Jones, The Trust Problem in the United States (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1921), p. 11.
Arthur Robert Burns, The Decline of Competition; a Study of the Evolution
of American Industry (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1936),
p. 147.
157 U. S. Congress, Senate, Regulation of Transportation Agencies (Senate
Document No. 152, 73rd Congress, 2nd Session. U. S. Government Printing
Office, 1934), p. 9.
158 Isaiah Leo Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission; a Study in
Administrative Law and Procedure (New York: The Commonwealth Fund, 1931-
1937), Vol. A, p. 205.
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and a number of authorities have favored pooling at various times, but
not the railroads. 159
International airlines have had a large number of pools, but the
circumstances of the international industry are quite different from
the domestic. Each country has veto power over admission of airlines
to its territory, and the countries with weaker competitive carriers
therefore still have strong weapons to force agreements; "chosen instru-
ment" airlines made for bargaining between governments rather than
between commercial enterprises; national ambitions are high and na-
tional treasuries are frequently low, making pooling economies more
desirable in the face of existing traffic.
Pooling is voluntary on the part of the carriers, and the CAB has
only veto power over the agreements. The CAB has been denied power
to restrict competition under section 401 (f) of the Act: "No term,
condition, or limitation of a certificate shall restrict the right of an air
carrier to add to or change schedules, equipment, accommodations,
and facilities for performing the authorized transportation and service
as the development of the business and the demands of the public shall
require."
The CAB has varied in its position on whether or not it should be
given this power. In 1943, the CAB requested it over all certificates,
especially for those to be issued in the future.16 0 It used an illustration
of a city which receives excellent schedules from a small carrier, where
it would be advisable to add a transcontinental carrier with a limited
number of schedules, but where an unrestricted certificate might pro-
duce undesirable and destructive competition. The CAB repeated
this request in the next year. 6 1 It repeated it again two years later,
but limited its request only to certificates to be granted in future
cases. 162 In 1950, the chairman said that the CAB was not prepared to
recommend that it be granted control over schedules.168 Later, in a
magazine article, he said that the industry should consider temporary
schedule control or pooling without either recommending or condemn-
ing the practice.6 4
159 Sharfman, loc. cit.
Sidney L. Miller. Inland Transportation: Principles and Policies (New York:
McGrnw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1933), p. 206.
Harold G. Moulton and associates, The American Transportation Problem
(Prepared for the Nstional Transportation Committee, Washington: The Brook-
ings Institution, 1933), p. xiv.
T. W. Van Metre, Transportation in the United States (Chicago: The Foun-
dation Press, Inc., 1939), p. 382.
160 Letter from Chairman, CAB to Honorable Josiah W. Bailey, U. S. Senate,
September 13, 1943, pp. 24-25.
161 Letter from Oswald Ryan, Acting Chairman, to Chairman, Committee
on Commerce, December 11, 1944. U. S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on
Aviation. Committee on Commerce, To Create the All-American Flag Line, Inc.
(Hearings, 79th Congress, 1st Session. Washington: U. S. Government Printing
Office), 1945, p. 16.
162 Letter from Oswald Ryan, Acting Chairman, CAB, to Honorable Josiah
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Pooling, on a voluntary agreement basis, would seem to be a good
expedient for temporary schedule restriction during a short business
recession. It might even be workable on a semi-permanent basis among
airlines in the more distant future, if and when the technological and
economic development of the industry have solidified into a fixed
competitive status. At present, it is unlikely that many airlines would
enter pooling agreements. Most of them would probably not agree to
settling for a fixed percentage of a route's traffic, because they feel they
might be able to increase their share. Even if some of them wanted
such an agreement, it is likely that the stronger of the competitors
would not.
Attempting to change the Civil Aeronautics Act to grant the CAB
compulsory power over schedules probably would receive great oppo-
sition. First, there would be the objection of the airlines to extending
the CAB's power into what has always been considered management's
function. The strong airlines would particularly oppose it, since they
would obviously be the ones whose present competitive advantage
would be cut.
With the power, the CAB would be thrown into all the detailed
difficulties of trying to work out a pooling arrangement. How would
the CAB fix the percentage of revenue each carrier would take from
the pool? Should it be on an equal basis, which was most common in
international airline pools? Or in proportion to the capacity scheduled,
and if so, how to determine which carriers should add or cut sched-
ules when service needs expansion or contraction? What credit should
be given for beyond-terminal traffic? Or should there be a sliding scale,
with a fixed minimum and a flexible participation in all beyond it?
At one time the CAB regulated number of schedules, but that was
under the very unusual conditions of war. During the last war, the
airlines were put under control of the military, and the CAB was dele-
gated the authority over scheduling. However, the standards of
judgment in specifying schedules were based wholly upon war con-
siderations, and schedules were allocated primarily to relieve priority
traffic bottlenecks. Financial considerations were purely secondary;
the problem was the wartime one of providing enough capacity for the
traffic, just the opposite of the usual peacetime problem of finding
enough traffic to fill the available capacity.
Without power over schedules, the CAB has no power to control
excess capacity. Any carrier can add schedules indefinitely; any two
or three can oversupply the demand. CAB control over route certifi-
cates, without control over volume of service provided, is not very
effective.
If no other solution were possible, CAB power over schedules
would be desirable. Regardless of the difficulties and enormous detail
involved in regulating the schedules of a highly competitive industry,
compulsory schedule limitation would produce a large net saving in
expenses. However, it is a much poorer alternative than a method
which could solve the problem and do it once instead of recurrently,
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require no interference with the scheduling prerogative of airline man-
agements, and have stable foreseeable results rather than the instability
of most pooling arrangements - elimination of competitive routes.
Mail Payments
It has frequently been suggested, as a method to reduce competition
as well as to accomplish other objectives, that the CAB use its mail
payment powers directly.
One form in which this mail pay power might be exercised is for
the CAB to set some fixed maximum rate for certain services. In 1944
and in 1946 the CAB requested that the Act be amended "so as to
clarify the present provisions of the bill by clearly authorizing the
Authority to fix mail pay at a level corresponding to the apparent
value to the public interest of the continued operation of the route,
even though the rate so arrived at might not be sufficient to yield the
carrier a profit over its estimated cost."'165 A former chairman of the
CAB supported the budgeting of airline mail payments, stating that
"There would, of course, be bankruptcies, but a commercial world
without failures that have to be paid for is not to be found this side
of paradise."'16
He also suggested later that the idea making most sense to him
was to have a rate for flying certain routes, and pay that rate to any
carrier that the CAB thought should fly it.167 Denial of all subsidy
payment to a carrier for a route thought to be illogical was also sup-
ported by the head of the largest airline.168 In slightly more specific
form, setting a fixed rate between any pair of points and paying that
same rate to all carriers between the points, was advocated by the head
of another of the largest airlines.16 This latter idea, of course, gives
no consideration to the characteristics of any specific routes which may
in fact give carriers a subsidy in the form of exclusive franchise rights.
Another suggestion was that a new route receive subsidy only
during an initial developmental period of perhaps two to five years.
Following that period, the subsidy would be withdrawn leaving the
carrier an option on continuing the service without further subsidy. 70
The other major form in which mail payments have been suggested
to control routes is in outright termination of subsidy pay, without
any particular time period or limit, when the CAB decides that the
public convenience and necessity no longer require the route. The
possibility of this was brought up by the Secretary of Commerce,1 7'
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and it was specifically recommended by the former chairman (and
present member) of the Senate committee with jurisdiction over avia-
tion legislation.17 2
The major objection to these suggestions is that they are probably
not legal under the existing Act. Section 406 (b) seems quite clear on
the subject. Once a carrier has been granted a mail route, it is entitled
to receive mail pay to continue the development of air transportation.
If the mail pay will not do this, the CAB is acting illegally. But, of
course, if Congress would not appropriate enough funds to underwrite
all the mail routes, there would be a fine legal discussion as to whether
it was the CAB or the Congress which was violating the Act.
The CAB cannot deliberately regulate number of schedules. Sec-
tion 401 (f) of the Act specifically states as much. On the other hand,
it is obvious that the CAB is not obliged to support every schedule
which a carrier wishes to operate. It has been generally recognized
that it is within the CAB's discretion to pay subsidy only for those
schedules which it considers in the public interest; the CAB cannot
do so where carriers receive a "service" rate that pays the carrier solely
an amount estimated to be the reasonable cost of carrying the mail.173
This power seems to be insufficient to regulate competitive sched-
uling in accord with any idea of economic logic except that of survival
of the largest. Where a subsidy and a service carrier compete, it is
usually the service carrier which sets the competitive pace.'74  The
subsidy carrier necessarily has to meet this schedule competition, or
give up hope of scheduling anything but a token service and of carry-
ing anything but token traffic. Since the CAB cannot restrict the
service carrier's schedules, if it wishes to keep the subsidy carrier's
route operating it must necessarily pour out mail payments to support
more service than is economically justified. If appropriations for mail
pay were cut below the ability to support all schedules the CAB would
wish to keep, the only reduction possible would be for the subsidy
carrier, and if any route had to be suspended because of lack of mail
pay support, it could only be the subsidy carrier's routes.
Where competition is between carriers each of which is on a sub-
sidy rate, a situation which would be almost universal during a depres-
sion, the CAB would have the legal power to judge as to how many
schedules of each carrier should be retained. However, the administra-
tive difficulties would be enormous. About two-thirds of the passenger
traffic on the domestic airline system is competitive, flying on hundreds
of flights daily. The CAB sets mail rates on a carrier-by-carrier basis,
and is usually far behind in its work. When the CAB would try to
settle the rate case of any one carrier, it would ordinarily have to take
into account the scheduling of that carrier against the competitive
scheduling of many other carriers. It would have the choice of restrict-
172 Edwin C. Johnson, "Committee Report to the Senate on Separation of
Air-Mail Pay from Subsidy," 18 JRL. OF AIR LAW & COM. 348 (Summer, 1951).
173 Joseph J. O'Connell, Jr., op. cit., pp. 405-406.
174 Ibid., pp. 405-406.
COMPETITION AMONG DOMESTIC TRUNK AIRLINES
ing the schedules of the one carrier without at the same time setting
the numbers of schedules for the competitors, or of having what would
amount to an industry-wide case where it would determine simulta-
neously all the allowable schedules of all the carriers.
The normal rate case procedure of disallowing schedules on the
basis of experienced load factors would quickly break down. Ordinar-
ily, when carriers are fairly equal in their volumes of competitive
schedules, they split the available traffic in rough proportion to the
number of schedules (with allowance for types of equipment, departure
times, etc.). But when any carrier takes a commanding lead in num-
bers of schedules, it tends to receive more than a proportional amount
of traffic because of the much greater schedule convenience it offers
the travelers; the minority carrier's load factor then goes down very
rapidly. Judged solely on experienced load factor, the weakest carrier
would have its mail support reduced to the minimum, and for all
practical purposes would disappear from the market except for token
service.
Despite all the administrative problems, however, it is possible
that the CAB could devise some statistical rules-of-thumb by which to
set schedules under varying competitive conditions. They would, of
course, be cumbersome, inefficient, and only approximate. If no better
method were available, it would have to be tried.
This is not to say that Section 406 (b) should not be changed. There
have been many arguments about it, both pro and con. They involve
far more issues than competition, and cover a number of important
policy problems. But from the point of view of regulating competi-
tion, a change in this section of the Act would be advisable only after
all other possible solutions had failed.
RECOMMENDATIONS
I. That the airlines and Government become familiar with the costs
of competition and their effect upon the industry.
2. That the route decisions of the CAB be reviewed at regular inter-
vals, and that the statistical, financial, and analytical results of these
reviews be published.
3. That serious consideration be given to reducing parallel airline
competition and thereby raising the traffic density of the route sys-
tem, particularly in view of a possible business recession or drastic
reduction in mail pay appropriations.
4. That the primary method of reducing competition be eliminating
routes by means of CAB purchases at reasonable prices.
5. That, as auxiliary methods,
a. Interchanges be initiated to preserve through services,
b. Where feasible, voluntary route transfers be authorized,
c. In doubtful cases, suspension rather than revocation be em-
ployed, and
d. For temporary periods, pooling be tried.
